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Note
Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, P.C.:
The New York Court of Appeals Pounds
Another Nail in the Coffin of CPLR
Section 214(6)1
I. Introduction
At common law, there was no fixed time period within
which a lawsuit was required to be commenced.2 Personal ac-
tions were simply confined to the joint lifetimes of the parties.'
Statutes of limitations were enacted4 to ameliorate the heavy
burden placed on defendants that existed under the common
law approach of maintaining the viability of an action until the
death of one of the parties.5 Such statutes reflect legislative
1. See infra note 246.
2. Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872,
301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969).
3. Id.
4. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, § 18.1, at 66
(3d ed. 1989) (statutes of limitations are legislative enactments whose origins derive from
equity, primarily the doctrine of laches).
5. See Flanagan, 24 N.Y.2d at 429, 248 N.E.2d at 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 25 (holding
that the statute of limitations was enacted to afford protection to defendants against
defending stale claims after a reasonable period of time had elapsed during which a per-
son of ordinary diligence would bring an action). See also Note, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 MINN. L. REV. 83, 84-85, (1972)
which reviews the rationale behind statutes of limitations. The author explains:
First, the primary purpose of [statutes of limitations] is to compel the exercise of
a right of action within a reasonable time so that a defendant will have a fair
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. Otherwise, the belated institution of
an action might prejudice defendant's preparation of evidence. Such prejudice
would commonly result, for example, where critical evidence is lost or where the
facts have been obscured by the passage of time or faulty memories. The death or
1
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judgments that proper investigation and preparation of a de-
fense cannot be undertaken after the expiration of the period of
limitation.' The statutes also serve the important function of
giving repose to human affairs. A valid statute of limitations
defense operates as a bar regardless of the merits of the claim.'
The statute of limitations defense has been one of the most
effective defenses against legal malpractice actions,9 and virtu-
ally the only effective affirmative defense.10 Legal malpractice
consists of the failure of an attorney to exercise that degree of
skill commonly exercised by an ordinary member of the legal
profession, that proximately results in damages to the client." If
it can be proved that an attorney's conduct fell below the ordi-
nary and reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by
members of the profession, he is liable in malpractice.' 2
removal from the jurisdiction of witnesses is a further problem. Second, the stat-
ute relieves the defendant from the otherwise endless psychological fear of litiga-
tion based upon events in the distant past. Third, it frees the judicial system from
stale claims which make resolution of fact issues both difficult and arbitrary.
Fourth, the courts are relieved of the additional caseload which would result if old
causes of action were permitted, thus promoting efficient judicial administration.
Finally, a limitations period avoids the disruptive effect of unsettled claims upon
commercial intercourse.
Id. at 84-85 (citations omitted).
6. See Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61, 63-64, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407, 409 (2d Dep't 1981).
See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) ("Statutes of limitations
which 'are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence', represent a
pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to
defend within a specified period of time and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in
time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them' " (quoting Wood v. Carpenter,
101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) and Order of R.R.Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342, 349 (1944))).
7. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117 (1979); Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Co., 12
N.Y.2d 212, 218, 188 N.E.2d 142, 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (1963).
8. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 18.1, at 67 (citing Fischer v. Browne, 586
S.W.2d 733, 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
9. Id. See, e.g., Bergman v. Fingerit, 177 A.D.2d 448, 576 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dep't
1991); Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205 (4th Dep't 1981); Johnson v.
Gold, 71 A.D.2d 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d 816 (4th Dep't 1979).
10. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 18.1, at 67. An affirmative defense is a
matter asserted by a defendant, which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a
defense to it. It is a response to a plaintiffs claim which attacks the plaintiff's legal right
to bring an action, as opposed to attacking the truth of the claim. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 60 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See Saveca v. Reilly, 111 A.D.2d 493, 494, 488 N.Y.S.2d 876, 877 (3d Dep't
1985).
12. See Grago v. Robertson, 49 A.D.2d 645, 646, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258 (3d Dep't
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Prior to Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, P.C.,13 there
was inconsistency and confusion among New York courts re-
garding the applicable statute of limitations in actions alleging
legal malpractice.14 Because legal malpractice actions generally
involve elements of both tort and contract,15 courts variously ap-
plied either the three-year malpractice (tort) statute of limita-
tions of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) section
214(6)16 or the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR section
213(2)17 for actions on a contract (or their respective predecessor
statutes).18 In Santulli, the New York Court of Appeals held
that in an action alleging legal malpractice, to the extent recov-
ery is sought for damages to property or pecuniary interests that
arose from a contractual relationship, the applicable statute of
limitations is the six-year period of CPLR section 213(2) for ac-
tions on a contract.19 The Santulli decision makes it clear that
virtually any action alleging legal malpractice that had its gene-
sis in a contractual relationship will be governed by the six-year
contract statute of limitations, rather than the three-year mal-
practice statute of limitations.20 This decision is tantamount to
indirect judicial repeal of CPLR section 214(6)21 which
prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for malpractice ac-
tions other than medical, dental or podiatric.22 Santulli also
clarified that the reasoning of two prior Court of Appeals deci-
sions that had determined the proper statute of limitations in
professional malpractice actions against an insurance broker and
an architect, was fully applicable to malpractice actions against
attorneys.2 3
1975).
13. 78 N.Y.2d 700, 586 N.E.2d 1014, 579 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1992).
14. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
16. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(6) (McKinney 1990).
17. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 213(2) (McKinney 1990).
18. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
19. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 707, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
20. Id.
21. See Vincent C. Alexander, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214, Supplementary Prac-
tice Commentary at 52-54 (McKinney Supp. 1993). Professor Alexander was commenting
on the Santulli decision in the Appellate Division (Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh,
P.C., 164 A.D.2d 149, 563 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1990)).
22. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(6) (McKinney 1990).




Prior to the Santulli decision, there was also inconsistency
among the different departments of the Appellate Division, and
even within the same department, as to whether an attorney had
to have made an express promise to achieve a specific result in
order for a client to maintain an action for breach of contract
against the attorney.24 Santulli held that there need not be an
express promise by the attorney to achieve a specific result.
2 5 It
explained that the breach of the attorney's implied promise to
exercise due care in the performance of services required by the
contract is sufficient foundation for the client to maintain an ac-
tion for breach of contract.26
Part II of this note will review the development of two theo-
ries of liability in professional malpractice actions, specifically, a
tort-based theory and a contract-based theory. A review of these
theories shows that what appeared to be a clear statement of the
rule for selecting the proper statute of limitations in malpractice
actions was inconsistently applied and confusion persisted.27 Va-
rious approaches to the statute of limitations problem in other
1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1983) (holding that the six-year contract statute of limitations
applied to an action alleging professional malpractice against an insurance broker);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767
(1977) (holding that the six-year contract statute of limitations applied in an action for
professional malpractice against an architectural firm). Both Video Corp. and Sears held
that actions alleging professional malpractice that seek recovery for injury to property or
pecuniary interests arising from a contractual relationship are governed by the six-year
contract statute of limitations of CPLR § 213(2). Video Corp, 58 N.Y.2d at 1028, 448
N.E.2d at 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 439; Sears, 43 N.Y.2d at 395, 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 770. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, P.C., 164 A.D.2d 149, 563
N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1990) (holding that an express promise by the attorney to
achieve a specific result is required in order for a client to maintain an action against the
attorney for breach of contract); Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166
A.D. 2d 505, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d Dep't 1990) (holding that an express promise by the
attorney to achieve a specific result is not required in order for a client to maintain an
action for breach of contract against the attorney); Pacesetter Communications Corp. v.
Solin & Breindel, P.C., 150 A.D.2d 232, 541 N.Y.S.2d 404 (lst Dep't 1989) (holding that
an express promise by the attorney to achieve a specific result is required for a client to
maintain a breach of contract action the attorney); Bloom v. Kernan, 146 A.D.2d 916,
536 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep't 1989) (holding that an express promise by the attorney to
achieve a specific result is not required for a client to maintain a breach of contract
action against the attorney).
25. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 705, 586 N.E.2d at 1016, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
26. Id.




jurisdictions, as well as the policy reasons for two tolling2s provi-
sions similar to those used in medical malpractice actions are
also examined. Part III reviews the Santulli decision by examin-
ing the facts of the case, its procedural history, and Judge Alex-
ander's opinion for a unanimous Court of Appeals.
The remaining sections analyze the Santulli decision, con-
cluding that although it provided a clear standard for determin-
ing the applicable statute of limitations in legal malpractice ac-
tions, it did not announce a new standard. The note concludes
that the Santulli court usurped legislative authority by effec-
tively repealing CPLR section 214(6). To restore significance to
this section, the legislature should take affirmative steps to
amend CPLR section 214(6) to provide for a three-year statute
of limitations regardless of whether an action alleging malprac-
tice is grounded in tort or in contract. Additionally, this amend-
ment should include a discovery exception 9 which would toll the
accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or
through exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission by the
attorney.
II. Background
A legal malpractice action combines elements of both tort
and contract. 1 One legal scholar has described such actions as at
28. A "toll" is a suspension or a temporary halt of the running of a statute of limita-
tions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1488 (6th ed. 1990).
29. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
30. "A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained thereon." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 21 (6th ed. 1990).
31. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, §18.3 at 69 (the hybrid nature of legal mal-
practice is such that the action may sound in either tort or contract). See also John W.
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 756-57 (1959). The
author explains the tort-contract dichotomy:
The attorney's liability for negligence arises out of the attorney-client relation-
ship. This relationship is created through a contract. Is the action for damages one
for breach of contract or one for tort? .. .If the action is treated as one in tort,
the court is concerned to find present the various elements of a cause of action in
negligence, and the fact that the duty to use care arises out of a contract normally
has no immediate significance. If the action is treated as one in contract, the court
simply declares that the attorney "impliedly contracts" to exercise the degree of
care, skill and knowledge which would be required by the negligence standard....
There are several statements to the effect that an action can be brought on either
1993]
5
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"the borderland of tort and contract".2 One concept of the legal
malpractice action is grounded in negligence. 3 Under this the-
ory, the breach of the attorney's duty to the client to exercise
due care in the performance of services gives rise to an action
sounding in tort.34 An alternative view is a contract theory,
which holds that the attorney's breach of either an express con-
tractual provision, or of an implied promise to exercise due care
in the performance of professional services, states a cause of ac-
tion for malpractice that is based on a breach of contract. 5
A. The New York Approach
Prior to Santulli, whether a malpractice action sounded in
tort or in contract could determine if the suit was time-barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.3 1 In New York, an ac-
tion for malpractice other than medical, dental or podiatric,
must be commenced within three years of the accrual. of the
cause of action.37 An action for breach of contract must be com-
basis....
Id. at 756-57 (citations omitted); see also Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gel-
fand, 491 P.2d 421 (Cal. 1971). In Neel, the court stated:
Legal malpractice consists of the failure of an attorney "to use such skill, pru-
dence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess
and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake." When such
failure proximately causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort. Since in the
usual case, the attorney undertakes to perform his duties pursuant to a contract
with the client, the attorney's failure to exercise the requisite skill and care is also
a breach of an express or implied term of that contract. Thus legal malpractice
constitutes both a tort and a breach of contract.
Id. at 422-23 (footnotes and citations omitted).
32. WILLIAM PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED Topics
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1954). "In 1826 it was said that an attorney might be liable
on the case for negligently handling his client's affairs, but when the situation arose in
1939 it was held that the client's remedy was exclusively on the contract." Id. at 407
(footnotes omitted).
33. See Wade, supra note 31, at 757; Note, Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract
Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 751, 752-53 (1979); Jonathan M. Albano, Note, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland
of Contract and Tort in Legal Malpractice Actions, 22 B.C. L. REv. 545, 545 (1981).
34. See Wade, supra note 31, at 756; Note, Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract
Analysis to Determine the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, supra note 33
at 752-53; Albano, supra note 33, at 545.
35. See Neel, 491 P.2d at 422-23.
36. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
37. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214 (McKinney 1990). The statute provides in perti-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/13
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menced within six years of accrual of the cause of action. 8 Be-
cause CPLR section 214(6) applies not only to legal malpractice,
but to all types of malpractice, with the exception of medical,
dental or podiatric, 39 the cases leading to the Santulli decision
nent part: "The following actions must be commenced within three years: ... (6) an
action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric mal-
practice .... " N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(6). The statute does not specify, however,
when the cause of action accrues, e.g. when an injury is caused or when an injury is
discovered. See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text. Section 214(6), which re-
placed section 50(1) of the Civil Practice Act, was originally enacted by Act of April 4,
1962, ch. 308, § 214(6), 1962 N.Y. Laws 609 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. &
R. § 214(6)). In its original form it stated only that an action to recover damages for
malpractice must be commenced within three years. It was amended by Act of May 21,
1975, ch.109, § 5, 1975 N.Y. Laws 136 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 214(6)) to add the phrase "other than medical malpractice". The Act of Aug. 1, 1985,
ch. 760, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 1851 (codified as amended at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 214(6)) added "or dental", and the Act of July 21, 1986, ch. 485, § 2, 1986 N.Y. Laws
997 (codified as amended at N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(6)) substituted "dental or
podiatric" for "or dental".
The legislature, when drafting § 214(6) had contemplated extending the statute of
limitations on malpractice actions to include contract actions, as evidenced by the legis-
lative history of the statute (e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. 1961, No. 15; Advisory Committee on
Practice and Procedure, Fifth Preliminary Report, § 214, subd. 6, par. 55; N.Y. LEGIS.
Doc. 1962, No. 8; Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, Sixth Preliminary
Report, p.93). Such language did not appear in the statute as eventually enacted, how-
ever. Similarly, the Law Revision Commission's proposal that the statute specifically re-
fer to "an action to recover damages for malpractice, whether based on tort, contract or
any other theory" was never adopted. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43
N.Y.2d 389, 395 n.1, 372 N.E.2d 555, 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977).
Malpractice first became a distinct cause of action by passage of 1900 N.Y. Laws, ch.
117, § 1, which amended § 384(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Prior to this amend-
ment, such actions were governed by Code of Civil Procedure § 383(5), 1877 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 416, § 1, which prescribed that "an action to recover damages for personal injury,
resulting from negligence" must be commenced within three years. Prior to 1900, the
term "malpractice" was used by the New York Court of Appeals to refer to the profes-
sional negligence of medical doctors. See, e.g., Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 209, 49
N.E. 760, 762 (1898); Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N.Y. 12, 15-16 (1878). See Richard B. Lil-
lich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 339, 339 n.1 (1962).
38. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L.& R. § 213 provides in pertinent part: "The following actions
must be commenced within six years: ... (2) an action upon a contractual obligation or
liability, express or implied .... " N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.& R. § 213(2) (McKinney 1990).
Section 213(2) was originally enacted by Act of April 4, 1962, ch. 308, § 213(2), 1962
N.Y. Laws 608. There have been various amendments to § 213(2) that are not relevant
to this discussion.
39. Medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice actions are subject to a two-year and
six-month statute of limitations. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-a (McKinney 1990). See




are not grounded solely in legal malpractice.4
The New York decisional law regarding the applicable stat-
ute of limitations for actions alleging professional malpractice
has been remarkably inconsistent.4I The cases, predictably, are
divided on applying either a tort statute of limitations or a con-
tract statute of limitations.4 "
1. Development of Tort-Based Theory and Application of
Three-Year Statute of Limitations
The early case of Webber v. Herkimer & Mohawk St. R.R.,'43
an action against a street-railroad company, held that where
damages resulting from the breach of a contractual obligation
are in reality due to a failure to exercise due care in performing
that obligation, a negligence or malpractice statute of limitations
applies rather than a contract statute of limitations.4 Similarly,
other early decisions held that regardless of the name given to a
theory of recovery, courts will look to the "reality" and the "es-
sence" of the action, and not its form, to determine the proper
statute of limitations." More recent cases have relied on this
"essence of the action" theory, as well."
In Johnson v. Gold,4 7 the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant attorney failed to keep the proceeds of a real estate transac-
tion in safekeeping until the plaintiff recovered from a stroke;
that the attorney had converted the money to his own use; and
that the attorney defrauded the plaintiff and negligently per-
40. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
43. 109 N.Y. 311, 16 N.E. 358 (1888).
44. Id. at 314-15, 16 N.E. at 359-60. See also Calhoun v. Gale, 29 A.D.2d 766, 767,
287 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 756, 244 N.E.2d 468, 296 N.Y.S.2d 953
(1968); Alyssa Originals, Inc. v. Finkelstein, 22 A.D.2d 701, 701, 254 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (2d
Dep't 1964), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 976, 250 N.E.2d 82, 302 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1969); Carr v. Lip-
shie, 8 A.D.2d 330, 332, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566, (1st Dep't 1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 983, 176
N.E.2d 512, 218 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961); Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140,
147-48, 111 N.E.2d 421, 423 (1953).
45. See Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264, 11 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1937);
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 300, 200 N.E. 824, 827
(1936).
46. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.




formed his fiduciary duty."' As the action against the defendant-
attorney was not commenced until five years after the alleged
acts of malpractice had been committed,' the plaintiff at-
tempted to benefit from the six-year statute of limitations by
drafting his complaint such that the cause of action sounded in
either contract or fraud.50 The court held, however, that it must
look to the "reality, and the essence of the action and not its
mere name".' The court found that despite the retainer agree-
ment between the plaintiff and the defendant-attorney, the real-
ity of the claim was that the attorney failed to use due care,
which gave rise to an action in either malpractice or negligence,
each of which was already time-barred by the three-year statute
of limitations."2
Similarly, in Adler & Topal, P.C. v. Exclusive Envelope
Corp., 3 the court, while recognizing the existence of an agree-
ment between the parties, nevertheless, applied the malpractice,
rather than the contract statute of limitations.54 In Adler, the
plaintiff accounting firm brought suit to recover unpaid fees for
services rendered.5 5 The defendant envelope corporation coun-
terclaimed, alleging that the plaintiff accounting firm failed to
exercise ordinary care in performing its services and had com-
48. Id. at 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
49. Id.
50. Id. An action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years. N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 213(8) (McKinney 1990).
51. Johnson, 71 A.D.2d at 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (quoting Brick v. Cohen-Hall-
Marx Co., 276 N.Y. 259, 264, 11 N.E.2d 902, 904 (1937)). See also Sosnow v. Paul, 43
A.D.2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1974) (plaintiff commenced an action against
architects for professional malpractice and breach of contract wherein both parties
agreed that a three-year statute of limitations applied since the defendants' alleged mal-
practice was the true basis for the claim sounding in breach of contract); Brainard v.
Brown, 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1983) (holding that the essence of a
legal malpractice action brought in contract was actually negligence, thus, the three-year
malpractice statute of limitations applied rather than the six-year contract statute of
limitations); Albany Savings Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, P.C., 95
A.D.2d 918, 463 N.Y.S.2d 896 (3d Dep't 1983) (holding that where the plaintiff alleged
tort and contract causes of action against the defendant law firm, the essence of the
action was the defendant's failure to use reasonable care in exercising professional skill,
which is grounds for liability in malpractice, but not in contract).
52. Johnson, 71 A.D.2d at 1056, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
53. 84 A.D.2d 365, 446 N.Y.S.2d 337 (2d Dep't 1982).





mitted breach of contract by not exercising the ordinary care re-
quired of accountants.5 All counterclaims were brought more
than three years but less than six years after the last services
were performed by the plaintiff accountants for the defendant. 7
The court held that the counterclaims were ordinary malpractice
claims that were time-barred by the three-year statute of limita-
tions.5 8 The court distinguished Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco
Assocs.,59 by noting that the parties in that case had entered
into a detailed, written agreement requiring specific services.60
Here, however, there was an "informal, underlying oral agree-
ment".6 1 The court observed that in virtually every accountant-
client relationship there is at least a "bare bones" agreement,
but such an agreement cannot convert all ordinary malpractice
actions into actions for breach of contract.6 2 The court reasoned
that to do so would effectively nullify the specific malpractice
provisions of CPLR section 214(6), "thus, making the statutory
provisions surplusage".6
In determining the applicable statute of limitations, courts
have also looked at the nature of the injury.6 4 In personal injury
actions where the gravamen of the action is the defendant's mis-
conduct and damage, the action sounds essentially in tort.
6 5
Where an action is for damages to property or pecuniary inter-
ests only, however, the tendency is to let the plaintiff elect his
form of recovery. 6 Different elements and measures of damages
56. Id. at 366, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 367, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
59. 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977). In Sears, the Court of
Appeals held that in a malpractice action against an architect, where damages that arose
out of a contractual relationship were to property or pecuniary interests, the six-year
contract statute of limitations applied, regardless of the theory of liability pled. Id. at
395, 372 N.E.2d at 557-58, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 770. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying
text.
60. Adler & Topal, 84 A.D.2d at 367-68, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
61. Id. at 368, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
62. Id. at 367, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
63. Id.
64. See In re Paver & Wildfoerster, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 675, 345 N.E.2d 565, 568, 382
N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1976).
65. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92,
at 666-67 (5th ed. 1984); Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1959).




may lead a plaintiff to prefer one cause of action over the
other.6 7 In the majority of legal malpractice actions, however,
the measure of damages will be the same under either theory of
recovery.6 8 Therefore, a longer statute of limitations for one the-
ory of recovery than for the other may well be the decisive factor
in electing a form of action; where the statute of limitations has
already expired on one form of action but not on the other, it
will certainly be the decisive factor.6 9
67. Id. at 664-66. See also infra text accompanying note 108. Contract damages are
generally restricted to those within the contemplation of the parties at the time the con-
tract was made, see, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), while
damages for negligence are recoverable for all injuries proximately caused. See WILLIAM
PROSSER, TORTS §§ 47-50 (4th ed. 1971); See PROSSER, supra note 32, at 422-29 for a
discussion on the differences between contract damages and negligence damages. Conse-
quential damages are recoverable for breach of contract if such damages were reasonably
foreseeable when the contract was made. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 351 cmt. b (1981). See also Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151; Bogner v. General
Motors Corp., 117 Misc. 2d 929, 930-31, 459 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County
1982).
Damages for breach of contract are allowed as compensation for the injury suffered
as a result of the breach, rather than as punishment. As such, the general rule in breach
of contract actions is that damages are limited to the pecuniary loss suffered and puni-
tive damages are not appropriate. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt.
a (1981). Punitive (or exemplary) damages are penal in nature and are different in na-
ture and purpose from compensatory damages. See generally W.A. Wright, Inc. v. KDI
Sylvan Pools, Inc., 746 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1984); First Nat'l State Bank of N.J. v. Com-
monwealth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F. Supp. 464 (D. N.J. 1978), aff'd, 610 F.2d 164
(3d Cir. 1979). However, punitive damages may be recoverable in a breach of contract
action where the defendant has manifested gross, wanton or willful fraud or high moral
culpability. See, e.g., Giblin v. Murphy, 73 N.Y.2d 769, 772, 532 N.E.2d 1282, 1284, 536
N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (1988); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (1961). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981)
(stating that punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the
conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recover-
able). Punitive damages are awarded for the good of society as punishment of the de-
fendant for a wrong in the particular case, to protect the public against similar acts by
the defendant and others, and to serve as a warning to others who may be disposed to
act similarly. See LeMistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 61 A.D.2d 491, 494, 402
N.Y.S.2d 815, 819 (1st Dep't 1978).
68. See Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 42, 555 N.E.2d
611, 613, 556 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (1990); infra note 215.
69. But see infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
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2. Development of Contract-Based Theory and Applica-
tion of Six-Year Statute of Limitations
In 1976, the Court of Appeals in In re Paver & Wildfoer-
ster7 signalled the erosion of the "essence of the action" the-
ory.7" The plaintiff in Paver demanded arbitration pursuant to a
construction agreement, alleging breach of contract and failure
to exercise reasonable care in the performance of the contract by
the architects who designed and supervised the construction of a
high school.72 The court held that in determining the applicable
statute of limitations in an action for property damage, it should
not be constrained by special rules, such as the "essence of the
action" rule73, which evolved primarily in personal injury actions
and which "depart from the general principle that time limita-
tions depend upon, and are confined to, the form of the rem-
edy. '74 It determined that when a claim is "substantially related
to matters encompassed by the substantive agreement", it
makes no difference for statute of limitations purposes whether
the action is in contract or in tort.75 The court, therefore, held
that the six-year contract statute of limitations applied. 6
The following year, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco As-
socs., 77 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Paver that
claims by owners against architects arising out of a performance
or non-performance of contractual obligations are governed by
the six-year contract statute of limitations.78 It stated:
All obligations of the architects here, whether verbalized as in
tort for professional malpractice or as in contract for nonperform-
ance of particular provisions of the contract, arose out of the con-
tractual relationship of the parties - i.e., absent the contract be-
70. 38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d 565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
71. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
72. Paver, 38 N.Y.2d at 672-73, 345 N.E.2d at 566-67, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 23. The
school developed serious leakage problems shortly after the owner took occupancy. Id. at
673, 345 N.E.2d at 566, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
73. Id. at 672, 674-75, 345 N.E.2d at 566, 568, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 23, 24-25.
74. Id. at 672, 345 N.E.2d at 566, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 23. The court provided no support
for the statement that the general principle is that time limitations depend upon and are
confined to the form of the remedy. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977).




tween them, no services would have been performed and thus
there would have been no claims. It should make no difference
then how the asserted liability is classified or described, or
whether it is said that, although not expressed, an agreement to
exercise due care in the performance of the agreed services is to
be implied; it suffices that all liability alleged in this complaint
had its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties.19
Paver and Sears appear to stand for the proposition that in ac-
tions seeking recovery for damages to property or pecuniary in-
terests that arose out of a contractual relationship, the six-year
contract statute of limitations applies regardless of the theory of
liability pleaded, at least in actions against architects.8 0
If Paver and Sears could be interpreted as applying only to
actions against architects, 81 such a restriction was removed by
the Court of Appeals in Video Corp. of Am. v. Frederick Flatto
Assocs.82 Video Corp. involved an action against an insurance
broker alleging negligence and breach of contract for failure to
procure full and adequate insurance coverage.8 3 The court held 84
79. Id. at 396, 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71.
80. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. See also Steiner v. Wenning, 43
N.Y.2d 831, 832, 373 N.E.2d 366, 367, 402 N.Y.S.2d 567, 568 (1977) (decided by the
Court of Appeals with the Sears case, holding that the six-year statute of limitations
applied to an action against an architect alleging negligent and careless performance of
contractual obligations, where the recovery sought was limited to a contract measure of
damages).
81. In actions decided after Paver and Sears, but before Video Corp. of Am. v. Fred-
erick Flatto Assocs., 58 N.Y.2d 1026, 448 N.E.2d 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1983) (see infra
notes 82-86 and accompanying text), alleging malpractice by professionals other than
architects, New York courts continued to apply the three-year statute of limitations. See,
e.g., Boorman v. Bleakley, Platt, Schmidt, Hart & Fritz, 88 A.D.2d 942, 451 N.Y.S.2d 179
(2d Dep't 1982) (legal malpractice); Lazzaro v. Kelly, 87 A.D.2d 975, 450 N.Y.S.2d 102
(4th Dep't) (legal malpractice), afl'd, 57 N.Y.2d 630, 439 N.E.2d 868, 454 N.Y.S.2d 59
(1982); Chemical Bank v. Louis Sternbach & Co., 91 A.D.2d 518, 456 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1st
Dep't 1982) (accountant malpractice); Glamm v. Allen, 57 N.Y.2d 87, 439 N.E.2d 390,
453 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1982) (legal malpractice); Yandel v. Loeb & Troper, 84 A.D.2d 710,
443 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1st Dep't 1981) (accountant malpractice); Bunker v. Bunker, 80
A.D.2d 817, 437 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1st Dep't 1981) (legal malpractice); Citibank v. Suthers,
68 A.D.2d 790, 418 N.Y.S.2d 679 (4th Dep't 1979) (legal malpractice); Central Trust Co.,
Rochester v. Goldman, 70 A.D.2d 767, 417 N.Y.S.2d 359 (4th Dep't 1979) (legal malprac-
tice); Douglas v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 70 A.D.2d 542, 416 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1st Dep't
1979) (accountant malpractice); Lacks v. Marcus, 68 A.D.2d 815, 414 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st
Dep't 1979) (unspecified malpractice).
82. 58 N.Y.2d 1026, 448 N.E.2d 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1983).
83. Id. at 1027, 448 N.E.2d at 1350, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
84. The decision of the court was a two-paragraph memorandum opinion. Id. at
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that where an action seeks recovery for damages to property or
pecuniary interests for failure to exercise due care in the per-
formance of a contract, the six-year contract statute of limita-
tions is controlling. 5 The court did not limit or qualify its hold-
ing to apply only to architects and insurance brokers, but
appeared to be stating a rule of general applicability.8 6
3. Property and Pecuniary Interest Cases After Video
Corp.
Although Video Corp. appeared to create a "bright line
rule"8 7 for selecting the proper statute of limitations in property
or pecuniary interest cases, confusion as to the rule's application
persisted among the departments of the Appellate Division and
even within departments."s Only three months after Video Corp.
was decided, the Third Department held that an action for legal
malpractice which sought recovery for damages to property or
pecuniary interests that arose from a contractual relationship
was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations.8 9 In
that case the court returned to the "essence of the action" anal-
ysis, holding that the alleged wrong was, in reality, the defend-
1026-28, 448 N.E.2d at 1350, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
85. Id. at 1028, 448 N.E.2d at 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 439. The court explained that
Justice Sandler's partial dissent in Video Corp. at the Appellate Division correctly ana-
lyzed the Sears holding. Id. (citing Video Corp., 85 A.D.2d 448, 457, 448 N.Y.S.2d 498,
504 (1st Dep't 1982) (Sandler, J., dissenting in part)). The court also expressly overruled
Adler & Topal, P.C. v. Exclusive Envelope Corp., 84 A.D.2d 365, 446 N.Y.S.2d 337 (2d
Dep't 1982), which had held that the three-year malpractice statute of limitations ap-
plied in an action against accountants alleging breach of contract and failure to exercise
ordinary care in the performance of accounting services. Video Corp., 58 N.Y.2d at 1028,
448 N.E.2d at 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 439. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
86. Video Corp., 58 N.Y.2d at 1028, 448 N.E.2d at 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 439; See
also Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't 1983). In Baratta,
the court applied the rule of Video Corp. to an action against a bank president for fail-
ure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract. Id. at 462, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
In holding that the six-year statute of limitations applied, the court declared "Video
Corp. seems to draw a bright line which will ease selection of limitations periods for
property or pecuniary interest cases, a process previously described as a 'snarl of utter
confusion'." Id. (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in
SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 310, 434 (1953)).
87. See supra note 86.
88. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
89. See Albany Savings Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, P.C., 95
A.D.2d 918, 919, 463 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (3d Dep't 1983).
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ant's failure to use reasonable care in exercising professional
skill,90 which was cognizable in legal malpractice but not in
breach of contract.9 1 The court did not mention either Video
Corp. or Sears in its memorandum decision. Subsequent Third
Department decisions did, however, apply the rule of Video
Corp. and the six-year limitations period to legal malpractice
actions.2
Less than a year after Video Corp. was decided, the Fourth
Department applied the three-year statute of limitations to a le-
gal malpractice action that sought recovery for damage to pecu-
niary interests arising from a contractual relationship.93 The fol-
lowing year, the First Department also applied the three-year
limitation period to an action alleging legal malpractice that
90. Id. at 919, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant law firm
failed to properly examine the title to real property. Id. at 918, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
After a member of the defendant law firm had advised that title to the subject property
was free and clear of any liens, encumbrances or defects that would affect marketability,
the title was discovered to be unmarketable. Id. The plaintiff grounded its causes of
action in both legal malpractice and breach of contract. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Bloom v. Kernan, 146 A.D.2d 916, 536 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep't 1989); San-
tulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, P.C., 164 A.D.2d 149, 563 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't
1990); Canavan v. Steenburg, 170 A.D.2d 858, 566 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dep't 1991).
Canavan applied the Video Corp. rule, although it cited to Santulli at the Appellate
Division to support its holding that the six-year contract statute of limitations applied to
a legal malpractice action. Id. at 859, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 961. Each of these cases involved
damages to property or pecuniary interests that arose from a contractual relationship.
See also Krouner v. Koplovitz, 175 A.D.2d 531, 572 N.Y.S.2d 959 (3d Dep't 1991). In
Krouner, the plaintiff did not allege legal malpractice, but the court found that the facts
alleged successfully stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 532, 572
N.Y.S.2d at 961. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations applied, citing
Video Corp. Id.
93. See Peduto v Durr, 97 A.D.2d 959, 468 N.Y.S.2d 953 (4th Dep't 1983). See also
Johnson v. Phillips, 115 A.D.2d 299, 495 N.Y.S.2d 824 (4th Dep't 1985). In Johnson, an
action for legal malpractice, the court did not explicitly hold that the three-year period
of CPLR section 214(6) was the applicable statute of limitations, but referred to the
amended complaint being filed more than three years after the alleged negligence. Id. at
300, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 825. It is thus apparent that the court considered the three-year
period to be the governing statute.
In two subsequent cases the Fourth Department did apply the six-year statute of
limitations to malpractice actions. See Banks v. DeMillo, 145 A.D.2d 903, 536 N.Y.S.2d
284 (4th Dep't 1988); Ralston Purina Co. v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 158 A.D.2d 969, 551
N.Y.S.2d 720 (4th Dep't 1990). However, both of these cases were malpractice actions
against contractors alleging faulty construction, in which the courts relied on Sears, but
did not mention Video Corp. See Banks, 145 A.D.2d at 903, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85;
Ralston Purina, 158 A.D.2d at 970, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
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sought recovery for damages to pecuniary interests.9 4
The Second Department, after applying Video Corp. to le-
gal malpractice actions in Sinopoli v. Cocozza,95 Kramer v.
Belfi, 8 and Drab v. Baum, 97 inexplicably applied the three-year
statute of limitations in three subsequent legal malpractice ac-
tions.98 Then, in Sager v. DeRiggi,99 another legal malpractice/
breach of contract action, the Second Department, citing to
Sears and Video Corp., declared "[i]t is now well settled" that
the six-year contract statute of limitations applies to claims for
damages to property or pecuniary interests that arose out of the
contractual obligations of the parties, regardless of whether pled
in contract or in tort.100
94. See Schleidt v. Stamler, 106 A.D.2d 264, 482 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1st Dep't 1984). In
Schleidt, the plaintiff's action was held to be timely because it was commenced two days
short of three years after the accrual of the cause of action. Id. at 265-66, 482 N.Y.S.2d
at 483. When the defendant attorney argued that the cause of action had actually ac-
crued earlier and, therefore, had been commenced more than three years from its ac-
crual, neither the court nor the plaintiff mentioned the applicability of § 213(2). Id.
95. 105 A.D.2d 743, 481 N.Y.S.2d 177 (2d Dep't 1984).
96. 106 A.D.2d 615, 482 N.Y.S.2d 898 (2d Dep't 1984).
97. 114 A.D.2d 992, 495 N.Y.S.2d 684 (2d Dep't 1985).
98. See Mazzei v. Pokorny, Schrenzel & Pokorny, 125 A.D.2d 374, 509 N.Y.S.2d 100
(2d Dep't 1986); Stampfel v. Eckhardt, 143 A.D.2d 184, 531 N.Y.S.2d 814 (2d Dep't
1988); Winkler v. Messinger, Alperin & Hufjay, 147 A.D.2d 693, 538 N.Y.S.2d 299 (2d
Dep't 1989). Stampfel is primarily concerned with the application of the continuous rep-
resentation doctrine. Stampfel, 143 A.D.2d at 185, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 815. See infra notes
131-41 and accompanying text. The memorandum of the court does not explicitly say
that it is applying the three-year malpractice statute of limitations, however, this can be
discerned from the dates of the pertinent events. The last act of alleged malpractice by
the attorney occurred at a real estate closing on January 26, 1981. Stampfel, 143 A.D.2d
at 185, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 814-15. The plaintiffs commenced the action on or about Sep-
tember 5, 1986, approximately five years and seven months later. Id. If the court was
applying the six-year contract statute of limitations, the action would have been timely
and there would have been no need to consider the applicability of the continuous repre-
sentation doctrine. It is, therefore, apparent that the court applied the three-year mal-
practice statute of limitations.
Each of these cases involved damages to property or pecuniary interests that arose
from a contractual relationship. Mazzei, 125 A.D.2d at 374, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 101;
Stampfel, 143 A.D.2d at 185, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 815; Winkler, 147 A.D.2d at 693, 538
N.Y.S.2d at 299. The courts did not mention Sears or Video Corp. in any of the three
cases.
99. 161 A.D.2d 571, 555 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1990).
100. Id. at 572, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 149. Apparently, it was not "well settled" for very
long, as this same court only fifteen months earlier applied the three-year malpractice
statute of limitations to an action for legal malpractice that involved damages to prop-
erty or pecuniary interests that arose from a contractual relationship. See Winkler v.
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The First Department apparently did not think the rule
concerning the proper statute of limitations in malpractice ac-
tions was well settled, because in the year following the Second
Department's decision in Sager, it held that the three-year mal-
practice statute of limitations applied in a pecuniary interest le-
gal malpractice action. 10 1 In light of the confusion and inconsis-
tency among New York courts in determining the applicable
statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions, it is appropri-
ate to briefly examine the approach to the problem taken in
other jurisdictions.
B. Other Jurisdictions
Other jurisdictions take a variety of approaches in deter-
mining the applicable statute of limitations in legal malpractice
actions.1"' California, for example, has enacted legislation at-
tempting to clarify the proper statute of limitations in actions
alleging legal malpractice. 103 The actual language of the Califor-
Messinger, Alperin & Hufjay, 147 A.D.2d 693, 538 N.Y.S.2d 299 (2d Dep't 1989).
101. See Bergman v. Fingerit, 177 A.D.2d 448, 576 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dep't 1991).
Bergman concerned the applicability of the continuous representation doctrine. Id. at
449, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 545. See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text. The defendant
law firm's representation of plaintiffs' interests ended following a certain real estate clos-
ing and mortgage acquisition. Bergman, 177 A.D.2d at 449, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 545. The
court noted that the parties did not have a retainer agreement or a contract for legal
services related to the real estate transactions. As such, the statute of limitations was not
tolled pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine. Id. But the court failed to
address the issue of whether a contractual relationship existed between the parties at the
time when the defendant law firm was representing plaintiffs' interests. It would seem
that at least an implied contractual relationship must have existed. See infra note 247
and accompanying text. The court held the action was time-barred by the three-year
statute of limitations of CPLR § 214(6) without mentioning Sears or Video Corp. Berg-
man, 177 A.D.2d at 449, 576 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
Only fourteen months earlier, the First Department did apply Video Corp. to an
action for accounting malpractice, holding that the genesis of the action was in the con-
tractual relationship of the parties and the remedy sought was a contractual remedy. See
Behren v. Blumstein, 165 A.D.2d 657, 658, 560 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (1st Dep't 1990).
102. This section does not attempt to make an exhaustive analysis of how every
state determines the proper statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions. Instead, it
shows a representative sample of approaches used in other jurisdictions. See infra notes
103-27 and accompanying text.
103. See California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.6, which provides in pertinent
part:
(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for
actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be com-
1993]
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nia statute, however, does not expressly state whether it applies
to actions against attorneys for breach of contract. 10 4 The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal in Southland Mechanical Constructors
Corp. v. Nixen, °6 after an extensive review of the legislative his-
tory of the statute, held that the legislature intended section
340.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure to include contract ac-
tions.108 The court explained that its holding would not elimi-
nate the right of plaintiffs to choose to bring an action for attor-
ney malpractice in either tort or breach of contract.10 7 It noted
that as both theories remain viable, plaintiffs will consider dif-
ferent elements and measures of damages in choosing one theory
over the other.'1 8 The decision will, however, eliminate the stat-
ute of limitations as a factor to be considered in deciding which
cause of action to pursue.0 9
A number of other states take a similar approach to that
taken in California on the question of which statute of limita-
tions to apply in legal malpractice actions. 1 0 These states, some
menced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reason-
able diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or
omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever
occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed
four years except that the period shall be tolled ....
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6(a) (West 1982).
104. Id.
105. 173 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). Southland was overruled on other grounds in Laird
v. Blacker, 7 Cal.Rptr. 2d 550, 557 (1992). Laird dealt with whether California's statute
of limitations for legal malpractice, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1982), is tolled
during the period the client appeals from the adverse judgment which precipitated the
malpractice action. Id. at 551. Laird does not discuss whether § 340.6 applies to actions
against attorneys for breach of contract. See infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
106. Southland, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
107. Id. at 926-27.
108. Id. at 927. But see supra text accompanying note 68; infra note 215.
109. Southland, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
110. See Zakak v. Broida and Napier, P.A., 545 So. 2d 380, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that an action for professional malpractice, other than medical malprac-
tice, whether founded on contract or tort must be commenced within two years (citing
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (West 1982))); Griggs v. Nash, 775 P.2d 120, 124 (Idaho 1989)
(holding that an action against one's attorney concerning the adequacy of representation,
whether pled in contract or tort, is governed by the malpractice statute of limitations
(citing IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (1990))); Hibbard v. Taylor, 837 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Ky.
1992) (holding that any civil action based on the rendering of, or failure to render profes-
sional services, must be commenced within one year of the accrual of the action, whether
pled in contract or tort (citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.245 (Michie 1992))); Herzog v.
Yuill, 399 N.W.2d 287, 291 (N.D. 1987) (the term "malpractice" in N.D. CENT. CODE
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by explicit statutory language, and some by judicial interpreta-
tion of statutory language, have held that all actions for legal
malpractice, whether based on tort or contract, are governed by
the same statute of limitations." ' The Supreme Court of Ha-
waii, in Higa v. Mirikitani,1 " explained why the limitations pe-
riod should be the same regardless of whether an action for legal
malpractice is pled in tort or in breach of contract:
In the absence of a legal malpractice statute, most jurisdictions
permit a plaintiff the choice between the contract or tort limita-
tions periods depending on how the complaint is framed. These
jurisdictions seem to recognize that in most cases the difference
between a contractual breach of the oral agreement between an
attorney and his client, in which the attorney expressly or im-
pliedly promises to exercise his best efforts on his client's behalf,
and a tortious breach by an attorney of his duty of due care in
handling a client's affairs turns on the phraseology employed in
the complaint.
This court should avoid applications of the law which lead to
different substantive results based upon distinctions having their
source solely in the niceties of pleading and not in the underlying
realities. We agree with the reasoning of Justice Tobriner, writing
for a unanimous California Supreme Court in Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand,113 that regardless of the no-
menclature used by the plaintiff in a legal malpractice suit, all
such actions should be governed by the same statute of limita-
tions. This follows from the proposition that, in reality, a claim of
injury resulting from the professional incompetence of an attor-
ney is actionable under theories which are an amalgam of both
tort and contract."'
The Higa court clearly and cogently states the argument for a
uniform statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions, re-
§ 28-01-18(3) (1974) refers to the "nature of the subject matter of the action and not to
the form of remedial procedure, whether it be in tort or contract" (quoting Johnson v.
Haugland, 303 N.W.2d 533, 538 (N.D. 1981))); National Mortgage Co. v. Washington,
744 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that actions against attorneys for
malpractice, whether in contract or tort, must be commenced within one year of accrual
of the cause of action (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980))).
111. See supra note 110.
112. 517 P.2d 1 (Haw. 1973).
113. 491 P.2d 421, 424 (Cal. 1971).




gardless of whether the action is framed as one for malpractice
or for breach of contract.115
The majority of states, however, do not follow the reasoning
of the Higa court and have varying approaches to the statute of
limitations problem.116 In Georgia, for example, a cause of action
for legal malpractice alleging negligence or unskillfulness, sounds
in contract, and if there is an oral agreement, it is subject to the
four-year statute of limitations of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (OCGA) section 9-3-25.1"7 A legal malpractice action,
however, can also sound in tort and be subject to the two-year
limitation of OCGA section 9-3-33."' The applicable statute of
limitations is determined based on how the plaintiff pleads his
cause of action.' 19
A number of states apply the "essence of the action" rule,
declaring that even though a complaint is pled as breach of con-
tract against an attorney, the essence of the underlying cause of
action is the attorney's negligence, and, therefore, a tort statute
of limitations applies.12 Other states hold that an action against
115. See id.
116. See infra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-25 (Michie 1982). See Ballard v. Frey, 346 S.E.2d 893, 896
(Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-3-33 (Michie 1982). See Ballard, 346 S.E.2d at 896.
119. Ballard, 346 S.E.2d at 896. See also Heritage Square Associates v. Blum, No.
CV 91 0117855, 1992 WL 175072 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 1992) ("there is an implicit
promise in the attorney-client contract that the attorney will perform his services ... in
a competent and professional manner and a breach of that promise supports a valid
breach of contract claim, even though the negligent performance of service may also give
rise to a tort action"). Id. at *5.
120. See W.C. Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Alaska 1990) (holding that
where the essence of complaint is negligence, the tort statute of limitations applies (cit-
ing Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1982))); Barmat v. John and
Jane Doe Partners A-D, 747 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (holding that where
the law imposes certain duties on an implied contractual relationship, breach of these
duties gives rise to an action in tort, not in contract); Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281,
286 (Ind. 1981) (holding that "the number and variety of Plaintiff's technical pleading
labels and theories of recovery cannot disguise the obvious fact - apparent even to a
layman - that this is a malpractice case, and hence is governed by the statute of limita-
tions applicable to such actions" (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-2 (Burns 1986))); Al-
dred v. O'Hara-Bruce, 458 N.W.2d 671, 672-73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a
cause of action pled in contract was in reality an action for legal malpractice, which was
time-barred (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(4) (1987))); Hickox v. Holleman, 502
So. 2d 626, 636 (Miss. 1987) (holding that notwithstanding an oral contract between the
attorney and client, the cause of action is based on the attorney's negligence, and a tort




an attorney for legal malpractice is tortious in nature unless the
attorney has made an express promise to achieve a particular
result and then fails to obtain that result. 21 When the attorney
has made such an express promise, an action for breach of con-
tract may properly be maintained and the contract statute of
limitations will apply. 22 The Supreme Court of Kansas modified
this rule by holding that in a legal malpractice action where the
conduct of the attorney constitutes a breach of specific contrac-
tual provisions, as opposed to a breach of the legal duties im-
posed by law on the attorney-client relationship (such as the
duty to use due care and to act in the best interests of the cli-
ent), the contract statute of limitations applies.' Where the
gravamen of the claim, however, is the breach of a duty imposed
by law on the attorney-client relationship and not of the con-
tract itself, the claim is tortious in nature, and the tort statute of
limitations governs. 2 4 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has also adopted this method of analysis. 125 Still other
states hold that actions for legal malpractice are always tortious
in nature and, therefore, a tort statute of limitations will always
Northern Mont. Hosp. v. Knight, 811 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1991) (holding that if the
essence of the action is tortious, a tort statute of limitations applies; if the essence of the
action is contractual, a contract statute of limitation applies, regardless of how the action
is characterized by the plaintiff (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2-202, 27-2-206 (1991)));
Werschky v. Moore, 706 P.2d 572, 574 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an action pled in
contract which implied a standard of care that an attorney would be held to regardless of
any contract, was governed by the tort statute of limitations (citing OR. REV. STAT.
§ 12.110(1) (1991))); Stevers v. E.T. & H.K. Ide, Co., 527 A.2d 658, 659 (Vt. 1987) (hold-
ing that the nature of the harm, not the plaintiffs theory of liability, determines the
proper statute of limitations).
121. See W.C. Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Alaska 1990) (holding
that in order to maintain action for breach of contract, there must be an express promise
to achieve a particular result); Towns v. Frey, 721 P.2d 147, 149 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that to assert a breach of contract claim against an attorney, the contract itself
must "contain an undertaking to do the thing for the nonperformance of which the ac-
tion is brought"); Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624, 628 & n.2 (La. 1992) (holding that
generally an action for legal malpractice is tortious and governed by a one-year statute of
limitations, but if an attorney expressly promises a specific result and fails to achieve
that result or agrees to do certain work and does nothing at all, the action is governed by
the ten-year statute of limitations for actions on a contract).
122. W.C. Jones, 791 P.2d at 1016-17; Towns, 721 P.2d at 149; Lima, 595 So.2d at
628 n.2.
123. See Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575, 578 (Kan. 1986).
124. Id.
125. See Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va. 1990).
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apply.12 Yet, other states hold that legal malpractice is always
contractual in nature and, thus, a contract statute of limitations
will always apply. 2 7 It is apparent that determining the applica-
ble statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions lends itself
to many methods of analysis and a variety of approaches are
used in states across the country.
C. The Continuous Representation and Discovery Exceptions
CPLR section 214(6) provides that an action for malpractice
must be commenced within three years. 28 However, the statute
does not specify when a cause of action accrues.'29 New York
courts have, by necessity, interpreted CPLR section 214(6),
holding that a malpractice cause of action generally accrues at
the time the alleged act of malpractice occurs.1 30
With respect to legal malpractice, there is an exception to
this rule where the attorney continues to represent the client
126. See Knauber v. Smith and Schnacke, 536 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that any action against an attorney for professional misconduct sounds in mal-
practice because Ohio does not recognize a distinct contract cause of action against attor-
neys who have negligently performed the services for which they were hired); Funnell v.
Jones, 737 P.2d 105, 107 (Okla. 1985) (holding that an action for legal malpractice,
though predicated on a contract of employment, is an action in tort and governed by the
two-year tort statute of limitations (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(3) (West 1988))), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1988) (holding
that a "cause of action for legal malpractice is in the nature of a tort and is thus gov-
erned by the two-year limitations statute" (TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003
(West 1986))).
127. See Hendrickson v. Sears, 310 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Mass. 1974) (holding that the
traditional view of a legal malpractice action based on an attorney's negligence is that
the gist of the action, regardless of the theory pled is the attorney's breach of contract);
Oleyar v. Kerr, 225 S.E.2d 398, 400 (Va. 1976) (holding that the statute of limitations
applicable to breach of contract governs actions for legal malpractice even though the
action may be pled in tort, because were it not for the contract, no duty would have
existed); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 288 P. 265, 268 (Wash. 1930) (holding that legal mal-
practice actions are based on breach of contract and governed by the statute of limita-
tions applicable to breach of contractual relations).
128. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 30, 37. In other words, the statute does not specify what the
"triggering event" is that the action must be commenced within three years of.
130. See Naetzker v. Brockton Cent. Sch. Dist., 50 A.D.2d 142, 148, 376 N.Y.S.2d
300, 307 (4th Dep't 1975) (stating that "[tihe rule in cases where the gravamen of the
action is professional malpractice is and has always been that the cause of action accrues
upon the performance of the work by the professional"), rev'd on other grounds, 41
N.Y.2d 929, 363 N.E.2d 351, 394 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1977).
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/13
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concerning the matter which gave rise to the malpractice
claim.'31 This exception is known as the continuous representa-
tion doctrine. 3 2 The continuous representation doctrine had its
origin in the "continuous treatment" doctrine that has been ap-
plied to toll the statute of limitations in medical malpractice ac-
tions. 33 The theory behind the continuous treatment doctrine is
that a medical patient will receive the most effective care when
the same physician attends to the patient from the initial treat-
ment through eventual discharge." Furthermore, if a doctor has
committed an act of malpractice, by remaining on the case he
may be more likely to discover and remedy his own error, than
would another doctor taking over the case in the middle of treat-
ment."'35 Thus, under the continuous treatment exception, a pa-
tient would not be required to interrupt ongoing, corrective
treatment by initiating a lawsuit against his physician prior to
the expiration of the statute of limitations. 36
The same rationale has been extended to other areas of pro-
fessional malpractice, including the legal profession.13 7 As it ap-
plies to attorneys, the rule acknowledges that a person who
seeks professional legal assistance is justified in placing confi-
dence in the attorney's ability and good faith, and cannot realis-
tically be expected to question and evaluate the methods uti-
lized or the manner in which services are rendered. 38 In cases
where the continuous representation exception has been applied
to toll the statute of limitations in legal malpractice actions,
there has been manifest evidence of an "ongoing, continuous, de-
veloping and dependent relationship'"3  between the attorney
and client that often involved attempts by the attorney to cor-
131. See Muller v. Sturman, 79 A.D.2d 482, 484, 437 N.Y.S.2d 205, 207-08 (4th
Dep't 1981).
132. Id. at 484, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text.
133. Muller, 79 A.D.2d at 484, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 207. See infra notes 134-36 and ac-
companying text.
134. See McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 408, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1112, 452
N.Y.S.2d 351, 355 (1982).
135. Id.
136. See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 156, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779, 237
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22 (1962).
137. See Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 94, 436 N.E.2d 496, 500, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46,
50 (1982).
138. Id.
139. Muller, 79 A.D.2d at 485, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
1993]
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rect a prior wrongful act or omission.14 ° Thus, to invoke the toll-
ing provision of the continuous representation doctrine, the rela-
tionship between the client and attorney must be one based on
trust and confidence, and embody a continuation of the profes-
sional services from which the alleged malpractice arose.14 1
Persuasive arguments can be made that the statute of limi-
tations should also be tolled until the client discovers that he
has sustained injury."2 There may be a considerable period of
time between the occurrence of the wrongful act or omission and
the discovery that such an act or omission occurred and thereby
caused injury. As an example, an attorney may make an error in
drafting a will. It is quite possible that the error may not be
discovered until many years later when the decedent's estate is
settled and the statute of limitations has long since expired.".3
The New York state legislature has recognized such a "dis-
covery" exception to toll the statute of limitations in actions for
medical malpractice where a "foreign object" has been left in the
patient's body as well as in so called "toxic tort" actions."14 At
140. Id. See also Citibank v. Suthers, 68 A.D.2d 790, 795, 418 N.Y.S.2d 679, 682 (4th
Dep't 1979).
141. Muller, 79 A.D.2d at 486, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
142. See Paul F. Mahaffey, Legal Malpractice: An Overview, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32, 36
(Jan. 1989).
143. Id. at 36. Of course, in this situation, the client himself never learns of the
attorney's error. It is the client's heirs who eventually discover the wrongful act or omis-
sion and are thereby injured. In New York, "[t]he firmly established rule ... with re-
spect to attorney malpractice is that absent fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other spe-
cial circumstances, an attorney is not liable to third parties not in privity for harm
caused by professional negligence." Viscardi v. Lerner, 125 A.D.2d 662, 663-64, 510
N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (2d Dep't 1986). The Viscardi court declined to depart from the firmly
established privity requirement to carve out a specific exception for negligence by an
attorney in drafting a will. Id. at 664, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 185. See also Spivey v. Pulley, 138
A.D.2d 563, 565, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146-47 (2d Dep't 1988).
In other jurisdictions, however, courts have held that an attorney may be liable to
intended beneficiaries of a will who lose testamentary rights because of improper draft-
ing of the will by the attorney, despite the lack of privity. See, e.g., Ogle v. Fuiten, 466
N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ill. 1984); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Wis.
1983); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983); Licata v. Spector, 225
A.2d 28, 29-31 (Conn. C.P. 1966); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
144. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-a (McKinney 1990). Section 214-a provides in
pertinent part:
An action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice must be commenced within
two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of ... pro-
vided, however, that where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/13
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least in these contexts, the legislature has realized that the poli-
cies served by statutes of limitations do not outweigh the inter-
est of a plaintiff in not being foreclosed from a judicial remedy
before he is aware that he has been injured and can discover the
cause of his injury.14 5 Considerations similar to those that in-
formed the legislature in enacting discovery exceptions in "for-
eign object" medical malpractice actions and in "toxic tort" ac-
tions, apply to legal malpractice actions as well. Two
commentators have explained the rationale for applying the dis-
covery rule to legal malpractice actions:
object in the body of the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of
the date of such discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reason-
ably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier.
Id.; see also N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 214-c (McKinney 1990). Section 214-c provides in
pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within
which an action to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property
caused by the latent effects of exposure to any substance or combination of sub-
stances, in any form, upon or within the body or upon or within property must be
commenced shall be computed from the date of discovery of the injury by the
plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such
injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier.... (4)..
• where the discovery of the cause of the injury is alleged to have occurred less
than five years after discovery of the injury or when with reasonable diligence
such injury should have been discovered, whichever is earlier, an action may be
commenced or a claim filed within one year of such discovery of the cause of the
injury; provided, however, if any such action is commenced or claim filed after the
period in which it would otherwise have been authorized pursuant to subdivision
two or three of this section the plaintiff or claimant shall be required to allege and
prove that technical, scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to
ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or determined
prior to the expiration of the period within which the action or claim would have
been authorized....
Id. (emphasis added). Section 214-c is commonly referred to as the "toxic tort" discovery
rule. See Joseph M. McLaughlin, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-c, Practice Commentaries
at 630-39 (McKinney 1990). The toxic tort discovery exception, thus makes the further
distinction between discovery of the injury and discovery of the cause of the injury.
CPLR § 214-c(4). New York also has a specific discovery exception for actions to recover
damages for injury caused by contact with or exposure to phenoxy herbicides ("Agent
Orange") while serving as a member of the United States armed forces in Indo-China.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-b (McKinney 1990).
145. See generally, Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d
871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969). The Court of Appeals holding in Flanagan was later codi-
fied as the foreign object discovery exception of CPLR § 214-a. See Joseph M. Mc-
Laughlin, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 214-a Practice Commentaries, at 603 (McKinney





A lawyer is a legal expert; the client is not and cannot be ex-
pected to recognize substandard professional conduct. Requiring
the client to ascertain malpractice at the moment of its occur-
rence casts upon him the unfair and impractical burden of either
knowing as much about the law as does his attorney or hiring a
second attorney to scrutinize the work of the first.""
The Texas Supreme Court, in Willis v. Maverick,147 concluded
that "any burden placed upon an attorney by application of the
discovery rule is less onerous than the injustice of denying relief
to unknowing victims.'14s
While Santulli did not address the issue of the discovery
exception to toll the statute of limitations, it involved a complex
set of issues that had divided the various appellate depart-
ments. 4 9 Specifically, the Court of Appeals considered whether
the three-year malpractice statute of limitations of CPLR sec-
tion 214(6) or the six-year contract statute of limitations of
CPLR section 213(2) applied in an action alleging legal malprac-
tice,15 0 and whether an attorney had to make an express promise
to achieve a specific result in order for a client to maintain an
action against the attorney for breach of contract.'51 The Court




Plaintiff Martin Santulli contacted the defendant law firm
Englert, Reilly & McHugh, P.C. (hereinafter "Englert Reilly") in
October 1980 with respect to representing him in the sale of his
146. Mark R. Friend & Joseph H. Hartzler, Comment, New Developments in Legal
Malpractice, 26 AM. U. L. REV. 408, 439 (1977) (citations omitted). See also Willis v.
Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. 1988). In Willis, the court also recognized that in
the absence of a discovery rule, in order to fully protect himself, the client would have to
hire a second attorney to observe the work of the first. The court realized that this would
be a costly and impractical solution that would only serve to undermine the confidential
attorney-client relationship. Id.
147. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
148. Id. at 646.
149. See supra part II.A.
150. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 707-08, 586 N.E.2d at 1017-18, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28.




hardware business.' 52 Santulli was to sell the business to Daniel
White for $75,000.' 53 The purchase price was to consist of
$40,000 in cash with the balance of $35,000 to be secured by a
first mortgage on certain property owned by Samuel White,
Daniel White's father.15  Englert Reilly was retained to perform
all services in connection with the sale of the business, including,
according to Santulli's allegations, preparing and recording a
first mortgage covering the entire property owned by Samuel
White located at 609 Verona Avenue in Schenectady, New
York. 5' Rather than preparing the mortgage itself, however,
Santulli alleged that Englert Reilly allowed White's attorney to
draw the mortgage. 156 A mortgage was prepared and recorded
with the local County Clerk in February 1981.' 57
After making approximately twenty monthly payments on
the mortgage, Daniel White defaulted.'58 Subsequently in May
1983, Santulli requested Englert Reilly's help to recover the past
due mortgage payments.159 When this collection attempt was un-
successful, Santulli checked the mortgage himself and found
that the most valuable part of the White property, the part on
which a house was located, had been excluded as security for the
mortgage debt.' e°
Santulli brought the faulty mortgage to Englert Reilly's at-
tention and foreclosure was considered. 6' In August 1983, how-
ever, Englert Reilly informed Santulli that it was unable to act
as counsel in a foreclosure action due to a potential conflict of
interest." 2 Santulli retained new counsel, but rather than initi-
152. Id. at 703, 586 N.E.2d at 1015, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
153. Id.
154. Record on Appeal, p. 34.
155. Id. at 34-35.
156. Id.
157. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 704, 586 N.E.2d at 1015, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. The portion of the property that was encumbered contained only two va-
cant lots and a shed. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Englert Reilly notified Santulli that because the partner (Reilly) who had
handled the sale of the business and was responsible for preparing the mortgage would
undoubtedly be called as a witness in a foreclosure action, Englert Reilly was disqualified




ating foreclosure proceedings,163 he brought an action against
Englert Reilly in September 1985 alleging legal malpractice and
breach of contract.1 6
B. Procedural History
Englert Reilly moved for summary judgment on grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and that the claims were barred
by the statute of limitations. 1 5 Santulli argued that the continu-
ous representation doctrine 6 tolled the accrual of the action
until August 9, 1983, the date Englert Reilly notified him that it
was unable to represent him due to a conflict of interest.1 67 If
Santulli was correct in this assertion, his malpractice action
would be timely commenced within the three year period of
CPLR section 214(6). The trial court denied the motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that triable issues of fact existed.'68 En-
glert Reilly appealed. 69
The Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the
complaint did not state a cause of action for breach of contract
because there was not an express promise by Englert Reilly to
achieve a specific result.17  But, nevertheless, following the rule
of Sears and Video Corp., ' 7 the court applied the six-year con-
tract statute of limitations to the malpractice action, because re-
covery was sought for damages to property or pecuniary inter-
ests that arose from a contractual relationship.7 2 The court
expressly overruled two of its earlier decisions, Albany Savings
Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, P.C.,7 s and
163. A foreclosure action would have been pointless, as the problem was that the
mortgaged property did not provide proper security for the debt. See Santulli, 78
N.Y.2d at 704, 586 N.E.2d at 1015, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
164. Id. The suit also sought treble damages pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487. Id.
165. Record on Appeal, p. 14.
166. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
167. Santulli, 164 A.D.2d at 150, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
168. Record on Appeal at 15. The court also dismissed Santulli's claim for treble
damages under Judiciary Law § 487. Id. at 18.
169. Santulli, 164 A.D.2d at 150, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
170. Id. at 151, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
171. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
172. Santulli, 164 A.D.2d at 151, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 549.





Brainard v. Brown,"4 which had each held that if the essence of
the action is negligence, the three-year statute of limitations ap-
plied.' 8 The court also held that the continuous representation
doctrine was not applicable because "'[t]here was not an unin-
terrupted course of reliance and services related to the particu-
lar duty breached.' ",176
One justice dissented in part, arguing that the three-year
malpractice statute of limitations applied when "the theory of
liability is based upon a breach of the traditional duties arising
out of the attorney-client relationship, not a breach of any par-
ticular contractual obligation. 11 77 In the dissenting justice's view,
an even stronger argument for application of the three-year stat-
ute of limitations was that the purpose of damages here was to
"make the client whole," rather than to allow the client to ob-
tain the benefit of his bargain.178 These circumstances combined
to make the action tortious in nature, thereby placing it under
the three-year malpractice statute of limitations.179 Both parties
appealed, by leave of the Appellate Division. 180
C. Judge Alexander's Opinion for a Unanimous Court of
Appeals
Initially, the court reviewed the Appellate Division's dismis-
sal of the breach of contract action.'8 Englert Reilly argued that
for a client to maintain a breach of contract action against his
attorney, the attorney must have either promised to achieve a
specific result and failed to obtain that result, or promised to
174. 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1983). See supra note 51 and ac-
companying text.
175. Santulli, 164 A.D.2d at 151, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
176. Id. at 150-51, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 549 (quoting National Life Ins. Co. v. Frank B.
Hall & Co. of N.Y., 67 N.Y.2d 1021, 1023, 494 N.E.2d 449, 450, 503 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319
(1986)).
177. Id. at 153-54, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Casey, J.P., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
178. Id. at 154, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (Casey, J.P., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
179. Id. (Casey, J.P., concurring in part and dissenting in part).






provide services and completely failed to perform. 18 2 The court,
however, disagreed with both Englert Reilly and the Appellate
Division below, holding there need not be an express promise to
achieve a specific result in order for a client to maintain an ac-
tion for breach of contract against his attorney.183 It explained
that the breach of the attorney's implied promise to exercise due
care in performing the services required by the contract is suffi-
cient basis to support a breach of contract action."8 " Applying
this standard, the court held that Santulli had sufficiently pled a
cause of action for breach of contract.18 5
The court next addressed the question of the applicable
statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action. 186 Englert
Reilly argued that the "essence of the action" rule'87 applied,
and that the "essence" here was its alleged negligence in the
performance of duties that.derived from the attorney-client rela-
tionship, not the breach of any contractual obligations."88 It
therefore asserted that the action was in tort and that the three-
year malpractice statute of limitations applied.'89
The court explained, however, that many of the earlier cases
that employed the essence of the action rule were cases that in-
volved personal injuries and thus "involved policy considerations
significantly different from those policy considerations involved
where the action seeks to recover damages to property or pecu-
niary interests only."' 190 The court therefore rejected the essence
182. Id. at 706, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
183. Id. at 705, 586 N.E.2d at 1016, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326. See supra text accompany-
ing note 170.
184. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 705, 586 N.E.2d at 1016, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326. The court
cited to the Third Department case of Bloom v. Kernan, 146 A.D.2d 916, 536 N.Y.S.2d
897 (3d Dep't 1989) and to its own decision in Video Corp. to support this proposition.
Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 705, 586 N.E.2d at 1016, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
185. Id. at 706, 586 N.E.2d at 1016, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326. The complaint alleged that
Englert Reilly "agreed to do all services relative to the sale of plaintiffs hardware busi-
ness, including the preparation of the first mortgage," and that defendant breached the
agreement of retainer by "failing to properly draw and record such a first mortgage." Id.
at 705-06, 586 N.E.2d at 1016, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
186. Id. at 707, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
187. See supra notes 43-63 and accompanying text.
188. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 707-08, 586 N.E.2d at 1017-18, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28.
189. Id. at 708, 586 N.E.2d at 1017-18, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327-28.
190. Id. at 708, 586 N.E.2d at 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328. The court did not explain
what these different policy considerations are nor did it distinguish or discuss any of the




of the action argument.191
An additional reason for not applying the six-year statute of
limitations, Englert Reilly argued, is that "traditional contract
principles" should not apply in the context of an attorney-client
relationship.'92 Such relationship, it asserted, is "unique,"
"much more than a contractual relationship," and "founded in
principle upon the elements of trust and confidence.' 93 Thus,
Englert Reilly asserted that claims against an attorney for mal-
practice should not be regarded as stemming from a contractual
relationship, as malpractice claims against architects and insur-
ance brokers have been so construed. 94
The court rejected each of these arguments and held that
the six-year contract statute of limitations applies to actions al-
leging failure to exercise due care in the performance of a con-
tract where recovery is sought for damages to property or pecu-
niary interests.195 It cited to its earlier decisions in Sears, Video
Corp., and Paver to reaffirm that "the choice of applicable Stat-
ute of Limitations is properly related to the remedy rather than
to the theory of liability."' 9' The court explained that whether
the action here is pled in contract as breach of contract or in
but where damages were to property or pecuniary interests. See supra notes 43-63 and
accompanying text. See also KEETON, supra note 65, at 666-67.
191. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 708, 586 N.E.2d at 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
192. Id. at 708-09, 586 N.E.2d at 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328. Englert Reilly relied on
Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 555 N.E.2d 611, 556 N.Y.S.2d
239 (1990), to support this proposition. The Campagnola court stated "[b]ecause of the
uniqueness of the attorney-client relationship, traditional contract principles are not al-
ways applied to govern disputes between attorneys and clients." Id. at 43, 555 N.E.2d at
614, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
193. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 708, 586 N.E.2d at 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328. See
Demov, Morris, Levine & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389, 444
N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1981) (explaining the unique relationship between an attorney and
client).
194. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 708, 586 N.E.2d at 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328. Englert
Reilly was referring to the Sears and Video Corp. decisions. Id.
195. Id. at 707, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327. The court cited to Video
Corp., Sager v. DeRiggi, 161 A.D.2d 571, 555 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1990), Sinopoli v.
Cocozza, 105 A.D.2d 743, 481 N.Y.S.2d 177 (2d Dep't 1977), and Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94
A.D.2d 454, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803 (2d Dep't 1983) to support its conclusion. Santulli, 78
N.Y.2d at 707, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327. It is noteworthy that Sager and
Sinopoli are both legal malpractice actions. See supra notes 95, 99 and accompanying
text.
196. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 707, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327.(quoting
Sears, 43 N.Y.2d 389, 394-95, 372 N.E.2d 555, 557, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770).
1993]
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tort as legal malpractice, without the contractual relationship
between Santulli and Englert Reilly, no legal services would
have been rendered and neither party would be aggrieved. 197
Thus, any liability flowed from the contractual relationship. 198
The court stated that, as it held in Sears, the description of the
cause of action is not significant because "an agreement to exer-
cise due care in the performance of the agreed services is to be
implied." '99
The court also rejected Englert Reilly's argument that ap-
plying the six-year statute of limitations to the facts of this case
would effectively nullify the three-year malpractice statute of
limitations of CPLR section 214(6).200 It noted that the same ar-




199. Id. (quoting Sears, 43 N.Y.2d 389, 396, 372 N.E.2d 555, 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767,
771).
200. Id. at 709, 586 N.E.2d at 1018, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
201. Id. The reported opinions of Sears, Roebuck & Co, v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d
389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977), and Video Corp. of Am. v. Frederick
Flatto Assocs., 58 N.Y.2d 1026, 448 N.E.2d 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1983), do not reveal
that such arguments were made and rejected. The Video Corp. majority at the Appellate
Division, however, made the same argument as Englert Reilly. It stated:
The proposed extension of the rule pronounced in the Sears, Roebuck case does
not pay due deference to the legislative pronouncement of CPLR 214, subd. 6,
establishing a three-year limitations period for "an action to recover damages for
malpractice." Viewed from a practical perspective, the difference between tort
damages and contract damages will not usually be substantial. If a six-year statute
of limitations is then to be applied to all actions arising out of contractual obliga-
tions which seek to redress injuries to property or pecuniary interests only ...
there would be virtually no cases remaining within the scope of CPLR 214, subd.
6, though that subdivision is broadly phrased. Nearly all "malpractice" actions
against attorneys, accountants, architects, surveyors, and perhaps insurance bro-
kers would fall within the rule providing for the six-year limitations period as
these actions regularly arise out of a contractual relationship and involve injury to
property or pecuniary interests only .... What role is left for the three-year limi-
tations period of CPLR 214, subd. 6, other than malpractice actions against archi-
tects arising from the collapse of structures which result in personal injuries? If
CPLR 214, subd. 6, were to be assigned such a curtailed scope, it would appear to
us that we would merely be giving lip service to "acknowledging the Legislature's
general address to malpractice claims (CPLR 214, subd. 6)."
Video Corp. of Am. v. Frederick Flatto Assocs., 85 A.D.2d 448, 451-52, 448 N.Y.S.2d 498,
501 (1st Dep't 1982) (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals, however, modified that
part of the Appellate Division's judgment that applied the three-year statute of limita-
tions to an action against an insurance broker alleging negligence and breach of contract,
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The court then discussed the measure of damages available
in a malpractice action that is commenced more than three but
less than six years from its accrual. 202 It held that damages re-
coverable would be limited to those damages that normally
would be recoverable in a contract action.20 3 Damages that are
not normally recoverable in a contract action would be governed
by the three-year statute of limitations." 4
The last issue the court addressed was whether the continu-
ous representation doctrine acted to toll the statute of limita-
tions. 0 5 It agreed with the judgment of the Appellate Division
that Englert Reilly's representation of Santulli ended in April
1981 when payment was made for services rendered in connec-
tion with the sale of Santulli's business. 6 Thus, the continuous
representation doctrine did not apply.
0 7
IV. Analysis
The Santulli decision presents a clear standard for deter-
mining the applicable statute of limitations in legal malpractice
actions. The standard is that when an asserted liability arises
out of a contractual relationship and the recovery sought is for
damages to property or pecuniary interests, the six-year contract
statute of limitations of CPLR section 213(2) applies.20 Al-
though Santulli does not announce a new standard, it clarifies
the standard for determining the proper statute of limitations in
legal malpractice actions.20 9 While Santulli represents the first
time the Court of Appeals has explicitly applied the rationale of
holding that the six-year contract statute of limitations applied. Video Corp., 58 N.Y.2d
at 1028, 448 N.E.2d at 1350, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 439. Thus, one may infer that the Court of
Appeals in Video Corp. rejected the argument that application of the six-year statute of
limitations effectively nullifies § 214(6). The Sears opinion at the Appellate Division
does not reveal that such argument was made. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 54
A.D.2d 13, 385 N.Y.S.2d 613 (3d Dep't 1976).
202. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 709, 586 N.E.2d at 1018-19, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29.





208. Id. at 707, 586 N.E.2d at 1017, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 327. See supra notes 195-99 and
accompanying text.




Video Corp. to a legal malpractice action, lower New York
courts have, albeit inconsistently, applied Video Corp. to legal
malpractice actions since 1984.210 Moreover, federal district
courts applying New York law have held that Video Corp. and
Sears apply to actions for legal malpractice.2 1'
It is clear that the criteria for selecting the applicable stat-
ute of limitations in legal malpractice actions needed clarifica-
tion. Not only was there nothing even remotely approaching a
consensus among the different states with respect to statute of
limitation selection in malpractice actions,212 but there was not
even consensus among the four departments of the Appellate
Division in New York. 213 This clarification was provided by the
Court of Appeals in Santulli. Perhaps Santulli will serve as the
"bright line rule"2 4 that Video Corp. never quite became for se-
lecting statutes of limitations in legal, as well as other types of
professional malpractice actions.
Santulli also makes it clear that when an action for legal
malpractice is commenced more than three years but less than
six years after the accrual of the cause of action, recovery will be
limited to a contract measure of damages.2 15 This could have the
effect of limiting the recovery one would otherwise be entitled to
210. See Sinopoli v. Cocozza, 105 A.D.2d 743, 488 N.Y.S.2d 177 (2d Dep't 1984);
Bloom v. Kernan, 146 A.D.2d 916, 536 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep't 1989); Sager v. DeRiggi,
161 A.D.2d 571, 555 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't 1990); Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau
GmbH v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 560 N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d Dep't 1990); Golub v. Baer,
Marks & Upham, 172 A.D.2d 489, 567 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1991).
211. See Cohen v. Goodfriend, 665 F. Supp. 152, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Schur v.
Porter, 712 F. Supp. 1140, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
212. See supra notes 102-27 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 86. But see also infra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
215. Santulli, 78 N.Y.2d at 709, 586 N.E.2d at 1018-19, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 328-29.
CPLR § 214(6) will still govern with respect to damages that are different from or
greater than a contract measure of damages. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying
text. However, these qualifications "are not likely to provide much solace for attorneys,"
since the measure of damages is usually the same whether an action is brought in tort or
contract. Alexander, supra note 21, at 52. For example, consequential damages for emo-
tional distress, usually not available in a contract action, would be governed by CPLR
§ 214(6). But even if a legal malpractice action was commenced within three years, such
damages would be difficult to recover. See generally Green v. Leibowitz, 118 A.D.2d 756,
757-58, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148-49 (2d Dep't 1986) (stating requirements for recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress).




under a tort theory of liability.2" In the majority of legal mal-
practice actions, however, the measure of damages under a con-
tract theory of liability will be equal to the damages under a tort
theory. '17 Thus, limiting recovery to a contract measure of dam-
ages will not reduce the available damages in most cases.
A. Post-Santulli
Four Appellate Division cases have been decided since San-
tulli that have relied on its holding.1 8 It is submitted, however,
that any one of the four cases could have reached the same re-
sult without any reliance on Santulli. Three of the four cite to
other cases in addition to Santulli to support the proposition
that the six-year contract statute of limitations applies to mal-
practice actions where recovery is sought for damages to prop-
erty or pecuniary interests arising from a contractual relation-
ship.219 Thus, while Santulli does not announce a new standard,
216. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. But see also supra text accompany-
ing note 68.
217. See supra text accompanying note 68; supra note 215.
218. See Nate B. & Frances Spingold Foundation v. Wallin, Simon, Black and Co.,
184 A.D.2d 464, 465, 585 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding that in an action
for accounting malpractice, negligence, and breach of contract, all claims are governed by
the six-year statute of limitations based on the remedy sought rather than the theory of
liability alleged); Miguel Padilla v. New York City Transit Authority, 184 A.D.2d 760,
762, 585 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (2d Dep't 1992) (holding that where a legal malpractice claim
seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests arising from the contrac-
tual relationship, the six-year statute of limitations applies); MTG Enters., Inc. v.
Berkowitz, 182 A.D.2d 388, 388-89, 582 N.Y.S.2d 130, 130-31 (1st Dep't 1992) (holding
that an action against an accountant for malpractice and breach of contract was gov-
erned by the six-year contract statute of limitations); Barth v. Barth, Sullivan & Lancas-
ter, 179 A.D.2d 1049, 1050, 579 N.Y.S.2d 283, 283 (4th Dep't 1992) (holding that an
action for legal malpractice is governed by the six-year contract statute of limitations).
One federal court has also relied on Santulli. See Cuccolo v. Lipsky, Goodkin & Co., 826
F. Supp. 763, 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an action for accounting malpractice
that seeks contract remedies is governed by New York's six-year statute of limitations
for actions on a contract).
219. Nate B. also cites to Golub v. Baer, Marks & Upham, 172 A.D.2d 489, 567
N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1991). Nate B., 184 A.D.2d at 465, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 417. Miguel
Padilla also cites to Golub, Sager v. DeRiggi, 161 A.D.2d 571, 555 N.Y.S.2d 148 (2d Dep't
1990), and Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH. v. Lerner, 166 A.D.2d 505, 560
N.Y.S.2d 787 (2d Dep't 1990). Miguel Padilla, 184 A.D.2d at 762, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
Barth also cites to Golub, Luk Lamellen, Sager, Bloom v. Kernan, 146 A.D.2d 916, 536




it clarifies and reinforces the rule promulgated in Video Corp.
Even after Santulli, however, New York courts have at
times applied the three-year statute of limitations to actions al-
leging legal malpractice.220 In Bass & Ullman v. Chanes,22' a cli-
ent sued his law firm for malpractice claiming it was negligent in
its review and approval of advertising copy related to the client's
mail order business.222 Although Bass & Ullman concerned the
applicability of the continuous representation doctrine, 2 3 the
court twice referred to the three-year period of CPLR section
214(6) as the relevant limitation period.22 4 The court must have
been aware that the client was seeking recovery for damages to
property or pecuniary interests, as it explained, "[t]he claim
here is that the law firm's negligence in reviewing advertising
copy directly injured the clients in their business. "225
The Bass & Ullman court made no mention of Santulli,
which had been decided seven months earlier. There is no indi-
cation that the relationship between the client and the law firm
in Bass & Ullman was not a contractual relationship.2 More-
over, the client sought recovery for injury to a pecuniary inter-
est.227 Thus, the Santulli criteria for application of the six-year
contract statute of limitations appear to have been satisfied. In
light of Santulli, it appears that the court's references to the
three-year statute of limitation period were incorrect.228
In Hirsch v. Weisman,229 a post-Santulli case, the First De-
partment held that the three-year statute of limitations gov-
220. See infra notes 221-44 and accompanying text.
221. 185 A.D.2d 750, 586 N.Y.S.2d 610 (lst Dep't 1992).
222. Id. at 750, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
223. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
224. Bass & Ullman, 185 A.D.2d at 750, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 610-11.
225. Id. at 750, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
226. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
227. See supra text accompanying note 225.
228. Because the court agreed with the plaintiff that the continuous representation
doctrine applied to toll the accrual of the action such that it was timely commenced,
even with a three-year statute of limitations, see Bass & Ullman, 185 A.D.2d at 750, 586
N.Y.S.2d at 610-11, the plaintiff was not harmed by application of the shorter statute.
The reported opinion does not disclose when the client's cause of action accrued. It
therefore is unclear whether the client would have benefitted from application of the six-
year statute of limitations, had the continuous representation doctrine been held
inapplicable.




erned an action against an attorney for malpractice. 30 In Hirsch,
the plaintiffs retained an attorney, Weisman, to represent them
in a personal injury action.31 Weisman then retained the law
firm of Zuller & Bondy to act as trial counsel.2 32 At the outset of
the trial, a partner in Zuller & Bondy negotiated a settlement
for $80,000.33 The plaintiffs agreed to the settlement in the mis-
taken belief that the defendants in the underlying action carried
only $100,000 of liability insurance. 34 When the plaintiffs subse-
quently learned that the defendants in the underlying action
carried liability insurance of $500,000, they initiated a legal mal-
practice action against Weisman.3 More than three years after
the settlement in the underlying action had been entered in the
record, the trial court granted a motion by the plaintiffs request-
ing leave to serve an amended summons and complaint on Zuller
& Bondy alleging legal malpractice.2 13 The motion was granted
on the ground that the action was governed by the six-year con-
tract statute of limitations. 237
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department held
that there was no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs
and Zuller & Bondy.235 It explained that the plaintiffs were in
privity only with Weisman, their retained counsel, and at best,
Zuller & Bondy had an "of counsel" relationship to the plain-
tiffs.23 9 Because there was no contractual relationship between
the plaintiffs and Zuller & Bondy, the court held that the three-
year malpractice statute of limitations applied rather than the
six-year contract statute of limitations. 40
The facts of Hirsch are unusual in that when the alleged act
230. Id. at 645, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 339.





236. Id. at 643-44, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 644, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The court cited and explained Santulli before
concluding there was no contractual relationship. Id.
239. Id. The court also explained that the plaintiffs could not be considered third-
party beneficiaries of the contract between Weisman and Zuller & Bondy without show-
ing knowledge of such contract, which they were apparently unable to do. Id. at 644, 592
N.Y.S.2d at 338.




of malpractice (the negotiated settlement of $80,000) occurred,
the clients apparently were unaware that another attorney in ad-
dition to their retained counsel, Weisman, was working on their
case.241 As the court held, in such a situation no contractual rela-
tionship exists between the client and the other attorney. 42 The
result reached in Hirsch, thus, is not inconsistent with the
teachings of Santulli. Santulli instructs that in order for a
plaintiff to receive the benefit of the six-year statute of limita-
tions, recovery must be sought for injury to property or pecuni-
ary interests that arose out of a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties.2 43  Because there was no contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and the Zuller & Bondy firm,
the court properly held that the three-year malpractice statute
of limitations governed.244
B. A Proposal
Although the Santulli court rejected the argument that its
holding effectively nullifies the three-year statute of limitations
for malpractice actions under CPLR section 214(6),245 in reality
it does exactly that, when there is a contractual relationship be-
tween the parties.2 4 As almost any conceivable action brought
by a client against an attorney concerning the attorney's conduct
in representing the client can be said to arise from the contrac-
tual relationship, where indeed there is such a relationship,247
and since damages will be almost exclusively to property or pe-
cuniary interests, the six-year statute of limitations will apply in
241. See supra note 239.
242. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
244. The Hirsch case is an example of the rare situation where an action against an
attorney for malpractice does not arise from a contractual relationship between the par-
ties. Cf. Syms v. Syms, 191 A.D.2d 340,- 595 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that
the three-year statute of limitations governed where the plaintiff brought suit for legal
malpractice against the defendant's attorney).
245. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
246. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 52. Commenting on the Santulli decision,
Professor Alexander writes "[alnother nail has been driven into the coffin in which the
Court of Appeals is inexorably burying CPLR 214(6)." Id.
247. A contractual relationship can be express, implied, oral, or written. See JOHN D.
CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-12 (3d ed. 1987); RESTATE-




virtually every malpractice action against an attorney.1 8 This
result is equivalent to indirect judicial repeal of section
214(6).49 It is not the purpose of courts to functionally repeal
statutes that have been duly enacted by state legislatures as the
elected representatives of the citizens of a state, absent a show-
ing that the statute is unconstitutional. 50 Notwithstanding that
generally, the longer statute of limitations benefits the public, '51
the court has overstepped its function of an interpreter of law by
doing indirectly what it can not do directly. 5 With its decision,
the court has effectively rendered a constitutional legislative en-
actment null and void. The legislature, by enacting CPLR sec-
tion 214(6), explicitly proclaimed that the statute of limitations
for malpractice actions, other than medical, dental, or podiatric
malpractice, is three years. Santulli, however, makes clear that
the courts of New York State, as well as other courts applying
New York law, are to treat the statute of limitations for legal
malpractice actions and for other types of professional malprac-
tice to which CPLR section 214(6) presumably applied, as being
six years when recovery is sought for damages to property or pe-
248. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 52-54. Of course, in a malpractice action
where there is no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the attorney, the
three-year statute of limitations will still apply. See Hirsch, 189 A.D.2d at 645, 592
N.Y.S.2d at 339. But in the typical situation where a malpractice action is brought by a
client against an attorney that was hired by the client to perform services, Santulli dic-
tates that the six-year statute of limitations will govern in virtually every case.
249. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 52-54.
250. See In re Mark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The Mark Indus. court
explained that "[a] statute is by definition the law to be followed - not disregarded,
effectively repealed, rewritten, or overruled (unless unconstitutional) .... This court has
noted not only the truism that courts are not at liberty to repeal a statute but also the
impropriety of judicial legislation diminishing a statute's effect." Id. at 1224. While the
Mark Indus. court was speaking in the context of a federal court, the principle is equally
applicable to state courts. See also People ex rel. Gordon v. Ashworth, 9 Misc. 2d 449,
450, 172 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1942) (holding that "Uludicial pro-
nouncements should not supersede or render legislative enactments ineffectual"). See
generally 16 AM. JUR. 2D. Constitutional Law § 316 (1979).
251. A longer time period in which to commence an action would be particularly
desirable when a client has not, and could not reasonably have discovered that he has
been injured, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. In such a circumstance,
without a discovery exception or some other tolling provision, the client is left without a
remedy. See supra notes 142-47.





cuniary interests that arose from a contractual relationship.253
While the result of providing the public with a longer time
in which to commence a malpractice action may be desirable," 4
the proper method of achieving this result is through legislative
enactment. In order to ensure that its objectives are achieved,
the legislature should take affirmative steps to amend CPLR
section 214(6).
The legislature should adopt the reasoning of the Supreme
Courts of California and Hawaii,255 by amending CPLR section
214(6) to provide for one uniform statute of limitations for legal
malpractice actions, regardless of whether an action is brought
in tort or in contract. The approach taken in California and Ha-
waii is the most rational and equitable solution to the malprac-
tice statute of limitations dilemma. Since injury resulting from
the wrongful act or omission of an attorney is actionable under
theories that are a combination of both tort and contract,2 56 the
reasoned approach is to specifically provide by statute that ac-
tions against attorneys, whether brought in tort or contract,
shall be commenced within one uniform period. The legislature
should specifically amend CPLR section 214(6) to provide that
all actions against attorneys for wrongful acts or omissions, other
than for fraud,257 arising from the performance of professional
services, whether brought in tort or contract, shall be com-
menced within three years of the date of occurrence of the al-
leged wrongful act or omission.258 This amendment would re-
store significance to CPLR section 214(6), in the wake of its
functional abrogation by Santulli, and eliminate a result that
obviously was not intended by the legislature.259 For reasons of
public policy, however, the amendment should also include a
253. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text. It is difficult to imagine a situ-
ation where the three-year statute of limitations would apply when there is a contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and the attorney. See supra note 201.
254. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 31-35, 114 and accompanying text.
257. Fraud involves a deliberate breach of a fiduciary duty and is, therefore, viewed
as a distinct cause of action from legal malpractice. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4,
§ 18.4, at 71.
258. The continuous representation exception would still toll the statute of limita-
tions in appropriate circumstances. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.




provision that would toll the accrual of a cause of action until
the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrong-
ful act or omission.260 In the contexts of medical patients who
have had "foreign objects" left inside their bodies and "toxic
tort" victims, the legislature has recognized the unfairness of de-
nying plaintiffs the opportunity to have a judicial determination
of their grievances when they could not reasonably have known
that they have been injured until after the statute of limitations
has run.26' It is time the legislature recognized that it is equally
unfair to deny the legal client the opportunity to "have his day
in court" when the client could not reasonably have known that
he has been injured by the conduct of his attorney until after
the statute of limitations has run.
V. Conclusion
The Santulli decision provided a badly needed clarification
of the applicable statute of limitations in legal malpractice ac-
tions. Now it is clear that an action for legal malpractice that
seeks recovery for damages to property or pecuniary interests
arising from a contractual relationship is governed by the six-
year statute of limitations of CPLR section 213(2).262 Lower
New York courts and federal courts applying New York law
have applied this same rule, albeit on an inconsistent basis, since
1984, after the Video Corp. decision.2 63 In addition to providing
this clarification, the court held that an express promise to
achieve a specific result is not required in order for a client to
maintain an action for breach of contract against his or her at-
torney.26 4 An action for breach of contract may be based on the
breach of the attorney's implied promise to exercise due care in
the performance of services required by the contract.26
The Santulli decision effectively nullifies the three-year
malpractice statute of limitations of CPLR section 214(6).266
260. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.




The six-year contract statute of limitations of CPLR section
213(2) now applies in virtually every legal malpractice action
where there is a contractual relationship between the plaintiff
and the attorney, as well as in other types of non-medical mal-
practice actions based on a contractual relationship.6 7 The state
legislature, however, by enacting CPLR section 214(6), explicitly
proclaimed that the statute of limitations for non-medical mal-
practice actions is three years..26 To ensure that its objectives
are accomplished, the legislature should take affirmative steps to
amend CPLR section 214(6) to provide that all actions against
attorneys for wrongful acts or omissions, other than for fraud,
arising from the performance of professional services, whether
brought in tort or in contract, shall be commenced within three
years of the alleged act of malpractice. This amendment would
restore significance to a statute that was functionally repealed
by Santulli. In addition, the legislature should adopt a discovery
exception to toll the accrual of a legal malpractice cause of ac-
tion until the plaintiff discovers or through the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have discovered the attorney's wrongful
act or omission.6 9 The unfairness of foreclosing the possibility of
recovery before a plaintiff has even an opportunity to learn he
has been injured outweighs any unfairness to the attorney in
having to defend an otherwise time-barred action.
Gregory D. Zahs
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268. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
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